North Dakota Law Review
Volume 38

Number 4

Article 4

1962

North Dakota Contribution among Tortfeasors Act
R. Lee Hamilton

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Hamilton, R. Lee (1962) "North Dakota Contribution among Tortfeasors Act," North Dakota Law Review:
Vol. 38 : No. 4 , Article 4.
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol38/iss4/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu.

NORTH DAKOTA CONTRIBUTION
AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1957, North Dakota enacted a Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act' almost identical to that adopted in
2
1955 by the Commissioners of Uniform State Laws. The purpose of this act was to correct injustices existing under the
common law doctrine of contribution between tortfeasors.
At common law contribution has been defined as "a payment made by each or by any, of several having a common
interest of liabiilty of his share in the loss suffered, or in the
money necessarily paid by one of the parties in behalf of the
others" 33 and as "the right of one who has discharged a common liability or burden, to recover of another' 4also liable the
aliquot portion which he ought to pay or bear.
The most noteworthy of the early contribution cases was the
5
English case of Merryweather v. Nixon. It concerned two
parties who had been levied against for a joint wrong. The
plaintiff paid the levy and then sought contribution from his
fellow wrongdoer. It was held that there could be no contribution between joint wrongdoers, apparently on the princi6
ple of in pari delicto potior est conitio. This rule was later restricted by the English courts to torts involving intentional
wrongdoers.7 The Scottish courts refused to apply the Merryweather rule at all, saying that there was no basis in law or
equity for such a rule. 8 In England, as late as 1934, it was held
by way of obiter dicta that contribution did not exist between
joint tortfeasors. 9 Finally in 1935, the English Parliament
1.
2.

N.D. Cent. Code §§ 32-38-01 to -04 (1961).
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSION-

ERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 218-25 (1955)

(hereafter cited as HAND-

BOOK (1955).
3. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 124 Conn.
227, 199 Atl. 93, 94 (1938).
4. Parten v. First Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co., 204 Minn. 283, 283 N.W. 408,
412 (1938).
8 T.R. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
5.
6.
Doyle, Contribution Between Joint Tort-Fensors in Wisconsin, 43
"Where the fault is mutual, the law will
Marq. L. Rev. 102, 103 (1959)
leave the case as it finds it."

7. Pearson v. Skelton, 1 M. & W. 504, 150 Eng. Rep. 533 (Ex. 1837);
Adamson v. Jarvis, 4 Bing. 66, 130 Eng. Rep. 693 (1827).
8. Palmer v. Wick and Pulteneytown Steam Shipping Co. Ltd., (1894)
A.C. 318 (Scot.)
9. Hillen v. I. C. I. (Alkali), Ltd. (1934) 1 K.B. 455.
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provided for contribution between those liable for the same
injury. 10
In the United States, contribution was usually denied
between joint tortfeasors" on the theory that it was contrary
to the policies and maxims of the law to allow actions to adjust
equities between wrongdoers, 12 or to allow actions to be founded on one's own wrongdoing. 13 Where the tortfeasors had
clearly acted intentionally, contribution was unanimously denied. 14 With few exceptions, 15 tortfeasors who had acted in a

negligent manner were also denied the right of contribution'"
on the theory that one knew when he was acting negligently
and hence acted intentionally."1 In jurisdictions where contribution is allowed negligent tortfeasors, a fine distinction has
been drawn between negligent and intentional acts. In Fidelity
and Casualty Company of New York v. Christensen,s the
violation of a minor parking statute was sufficient to show
intentional wrongdoing on the part of the tortfeasor seeking
contribution. In Ohio, contribution could be had when the
tort concerned an injury to property5 but was denied when
the tort was an assault on the person, no matter how innocent
2
of wrongful intent.

0

Due to injustices, the early American courts developed
exceptions to the rule denying contribution between tortfeasors. Contribution was allowed for court costs 2' or counsel
10. Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 1935, 25 & 26
Geo. 5, c. 30 § 6.
11. E.g., Old Colony St. Ry. Co. v. Brockton, 218 Mass. 84, 105 N.E. 866
(1914); United States Cas. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of No. America, 129
Ohio St. 391, 195 N.E. 850 (1935).
12. Slater v. Ianni Const. Co., 268 Mich. 492, 256 N.W. 495 (1934); Manowitz v. Kanov, 107 N.J.L. 523, 154 Atl. 326 (1932).
13. Gilmore v. Fuller, 198 Ill. 130, 65 N.E. 84 (1902).
14. Baird v. John McShain, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 553 (D.D.C. 1952); Davis
v. Gehaus, 44 Ohio St. 69, 4 N.E. 593 (1886); Boyer v. Bolander, 129 Pa.
324, 18 Atl. 127 (1889).
15. George's Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir.
1942); Quatray v. Wicker, 178 La. 289, 151 So. 208 (1931); Employer's Mut
Cas. Co. v. Chicago St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 235 Minn. 304, 50 N.W.2d 689
(1951).
16. Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago B. & Q. R.R. Co., 196 U.S. 217
(1905); Adams v. White Bus Line, 184 Cal. 710, 195 Pac. 389 (1921); Village
of Portland v. Citizens Tel. Co., 206 Mich. 632, 173, N.W. 382 (1919); Royal
Indem. Co. v. Becker, 122 Ohio St. 582, 173 N.E. 194 (1930).
17. Gobble v. Brardford, 226 Ala. 517, 147 So. 619, 622 (1933) "They
(tortfeasors) must be presumed to have known that such negligent operation was wrongful."
18.
183 Minn. 182, 236 N.W. 618 (1931).
19. Acheson v. Miller, 2 Ohio St. 203, 205 (1853) "We suppose the rule
(against contribution) only applies to cases where the persons have engaged together in doing wantonly or knowingly a wrong."
20.' Cumpston v. Lambert, 18 Ohio St. 81, 51 Am. Dec. 442 (1849).
21. Fakes v. Price, 18 Okla. 413, 89 Pac. 1123 (1907).
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fees2 2 incurred in the defense of the tort. Some courts adopted

a passive and active negligence theory3 wherein contribution
would be allowed to the tortfeasor found to be only passively
negligent.24 Closely related to this theory was the allowance
of contribution to those tortfeasors liable only by legal inference or intendment25 or to those who could show that their
acts were not intentional, or morally wrong.26 Some states,

while denying contribution between tortfeasors, allowed it
between their subrogees.27

The release by the injured party of one tortfeasor at common law was held to release all of them. 2 Holdings such as

these were based on the theory that the satisfaction by one of
the tortfeasors was satisfaction for the plaintiff's whole damages. If he were allowed to sue the other tortfeasor, he would
be receiving double compensation for his injury2 9 This rule
produced unjust results when the plaintiff gave a release to
one party for a nominal sum intending to collect his full damages from the other. 0 As a result of this, the courts began to
devise ways in which a release to one tortfeasor did not release
the other. One such device was the covenant not to sue. 1
Such was the development of the common law doctrine of
contribution between tortfeasors. The doctrine was often unjust and rarely understood by the courts that applied it.
Prosser states ".. .once the door was thrown open to joinder

in one action of those who had merely caused the same damage, the origin of the rule and the reason for it were lost to
32

sight."
22.

Licht v.

Klipp, 213 Iowa 1071,

240 N.W. 722 (1932).

23. English v. Miller, 33 S.W.2d 476, 478 "(P)assive negligence is a
failure to do something that should have been done. (Active negligence
is) the doing of something that should not have been done."
24. Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Swift & Co., 23 Ga. App. 346, 98 S.E. 256
(1919); Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Sanders, 138 S.W. 1181 (1911).
25.

Hobbs v.

26.

Herr v. Barber, 2 Mackey 545, 13 D.C. 545

Tel. v.

Leoegue,

Hurley, 117 Me. 449,
30

Ill. App. 2d 120,

104 Atl. 815

(1918).

(1883); American Tel. &

173 N.E.2d 737

(1961);

Furbeck v.

L

Gevurtz & Son, 72 Or. 12, 143 Pac. 654 (1914).
27. Gale Lumber Co. v. Bush, 227 Mass. 203, 116 N.E. 480 (1917); Kolb
v. National Sur. Co. 176 N.Y. 233, 68 N.E. 247 (1903)
(Contribution allowed against other tortfeasor to insurer of one tortfeasor).
28. Rushford v. United States, 204 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1953) (dictum); Bee
v. Cooper, 217 Cal. 96, 17 P.2d 740 (1932).
29. Hawber v. Raley, 92 Cal. App. 701, 268 Pac. 943 (1928); Pinkham
Lumber Co. v. Woodland State Bank, 156 Wash. 117, 286 Pac. 95 (1930).
30. Bee v. Cooper, supra note 28.
31. Dwy v. Connecticut Co., 89 Conn. 74, 92 Atl. 883 (1915); Gilbert v.
Finch, 173 N.Y. 455, 66 N.E. 133 (1903).
32. PROSSER, TORTS 247 (2d ed. 1955).
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II. THE NORTH DAKOTA CONTRIBUTION
AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT

In 1939, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws saw
a need for a statute which would reverse the common law rules
regarding contribution between tortfeasors and the release
of those tortfeasors. The result was the 1939 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. 33 Between 1939 and 1955, only
eight states adopted this act. 34 As a result of such slow acceptance, the Commissioners withdrew the 1939 Act in 1955
and revised it in the hope that it would be more acceptable to
the various states. 35 To date, North Dakota is the only state
which has adopted the 1955 Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act.

36

While there are material differences between the 1939 Act
and the 1955 Act, their principles are basically the same,
namely to "distribute the burden of responsibility equitably
avoid the injustice
among those who are jointly liable and thus
37
often resulting under the common law.

A. Right to contribution
The right to contribution between tortfeasors in North
Dakota is dependent upon several conditions precedent. It is
first required that two or more persons become jointly or
severally liable in tort for the same injury to person, or prop-

erty, or for the same wrongful death.38 The effect of such

condition is to deny contribution where one of the tortfeasors
is not liable to the injured party.3 9 In North Dakota, there
are several situations in which one tortfeasor would not be
liable to the injured party. Employees under the North Dakota
Workmen's Compensation Act can not entertain an action
against their employer for injuries received in the course of
33. 9 U.L.A. 233-52 (1957) (hereinafter cited as 1939 Act).
34. Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 34-1001 to 34-1009 (1947); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10,
§§ 6301 to 6308 (1953); Hawaii Rev. Laws §§ 246-10 to 246-16 (1955); Md.
Ann. Code art. 50 §§ 16 to 24 (1957); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-1-11 to 24-1-18;
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12 §§ 2082 to 2089 (1959); R. I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 10-6-1
to 10-6-11 (1956); S.D. Code §§ 33.04A01 to 33.04A10 (SupP. 1960).
35. Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 9 U.L.A. 68-74 (Supp.
1961).
36. N.D. Cent. Code § 32-38-01 to -04 (1961).
37. HANDBOOK (1955), supra note 2, at 216; Cf. Hackett v. Hyson, 72
R.I. 132, 48 A.2d 353 (1946).
38. N.D. Cent. Code § 32-38-01 (1961).
39. Lutz v. Boltz, 100 A.2d 647 (Del. 1953). (One tortfeasor not liable
under guest statute.); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jewel Tea Co., 202 Va.
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employment. 4 0 Thus, where an employer and a third person
injured an employee, contribution could not be claimed from
the employer since he would not be liable to the injured employee. 41 The same result would be obtained under the North
Dakota Guest Statute, 42 wherein a host driver is not liable to
43
his guest for ordinary negligence.
In the construction of section 32-38-01 it is necessary to
determine when the common liability arises. In Distefano v.
Lamborn44 the court held that the right to contribution, as
distinct from the right to institute an action for contribution,
arose on the occurrence of the tortious act. If the right of contribution did not arise until payment by one tortfeasor, the
act would be ineffective in situations wherein the liability of
one tortfeasor was extinguished by operation of law before
the other tortfeasor could settle the claim for the injury. In
an action for contribution it is not necessary for a judgment
to have been rendered determining the liability of the tortfeasors. 45 However, it is a condition precedent that the tortfeasor seeking contribution show that he has paid more than
his pro rata share of the common liability.6 As will be shown
later in this note, the definition of what is the common liability
as used in this section of the act becomes extremely important.
Under the 1939 Act 47 no provision was made for the subrogation of an insurer to his insured's right of contribution.
Recognizing that in some jurisdictions insurers were prohibited subrogation to a tortfeasor's right of contribution,4 s
the 1955 Act provided for subrogation of an insurer to the
extent that the insurer has paid in excess of the tortfeasor's
pro rata share.9
50
An analogy to this is the Workmen's Compensation Act
527, 118 S.E.2d 646 (1961); Shrofe v. Rural Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 258 Wis. 128,
45 N.W.2d 76 (1950) (Injured party assumed risk of one tortfeasor's negligence).
40. N.D. Cent. Code § 65-01-08 (1961); N.D. Cent. Code § 65-04-28 (1961).
41. See Stulginski v. Cizauskas, 125 Conn. 293, 5 A.2d 10 (1939).
42. N.D. Cent. Code ch. 39-15 (1961).
43. Borstad v. LaRoque, 98 N.W.2d 16 (N.D. 1961).
44. 46 Del. 195, 81 A.2d 675, aff'd on rehearing,. 83 A.2d 300 (1951).
45. N.D. Cent. Code § 32-38-01 (1961).
46. N.D. Cent. Code § 32-38-01(2) (1961).
47. 1939 Act. 9 U.L.A. 233-52 (1957).
48. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 211
N.C. 13, 188 S.E. 634 (1936).
49. 1955 Act, 9 U.L.A. 68-74 at § l(e) (Supp. 1961).
50. N.D. Cent. Code ch. 65-01 (1961).
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which has been held to be insurance to a limited extent.51
However, the Workmen's Compensation Act provides that it
will be subrogated to the extent it has paid the claim of an
employee against a third party tortfeasor.52 This provision of
the Workmen's Compensation Act is not in conflict with section 32-38-01 of the Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act,
because a negligent employer is not liable to his employee 53
and hence not liable for contribution. 54 Therefore, a third
party tortfeasor would be entirely liable for the damages of
the injured employee since the contribution statute would not
apply.
In another situation, involving subrogation, when the injured party is indemnified by his own insurer, the tortfeasor
cannot credit this amount to the judgment against him on the
grounds that he cannot benefit from the settlement between
5
the plaintiff and the plaintiff's insurer. 5
The right of contribution is denied the intentional (willful
or wanton) tortfeasor56 as under common law. What is willful or wanton under the North Dakota Act has yet to be determined in North Dakota. However, it is submitted that an act
which is defined as grossly negligent in North Dakota will
come within the meaning of willful or wanton. 7 A tortfeasor
guilty of ordinary negligence may always receive contribu8
tion from the willful tortfeasor.5
The North Dakota Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
provides: "This chapter does not impair any right or indemnity under existing law."59 The Commissioners in their comment on the 1955 Act state that this clause is identical to the
51. Sandlie v. N. D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 70 N.D. 449, 295 N.W.
497 (1941).
52. N.D. Cent. Code § 65-01-09 (1961).
53. N.D. Cent. Code § 65-04-28 (1961).
54. N.D. Cent. Code § 32-38-01 (1961).
55. Alpaugh v. Krajcer, 57 So. 2d 700 (La. 1952); Messina v. Bomicino, 27
So. 2d 397 (La. 1946).
56. N.D. Cent. Code § 32-38-01(3) (1961).
57. N.D. Cent. Code § 1-01-17 (1961) "(Gross negligence is) in want of
slight care and diligence."; Farmers Mercantile Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry.
Co., 27 N.D. 302, 146 N.W. 550, 552 (1914) "Gross negligence is . . . no care
at all. It is the omission of the care which even the most inattentive and
thoughtless seldom fail to take of their own concern.
It evinces a
reckless temperament. It is a lack of care practically willful in its nature.
It is an omission of duty which Is akin to fraud. It is the absence of
even slight care."
58. Hoffer v. Short, 297 F.2d 153 (4th'Cir. 1961).
59. N.D. Cent. Code § 32-38-01(6) (1961).
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1939 Act.60 However, this writer has noted a discrepancy
between the 1955 and 1939 Act in this clause. The 1939 Act
reads any "right of indemnity"l The Chairman of the Commissioners' committee which recommended the 1955 Act for
adoption has stated that the word "or" was a typographical
''
error and that the 1955 Act should read "right of indemnity. 62
It is possible to construe the present statute (right or indemnity) as providing that any existing right under existing
law would not be affected by the Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. Such a construction would, in effect, nullify the
enforcement provisions of the statute.
It is submitted that since North Dakota adopted the published text of the 1955 Act, which used the word "or" by
mistake, the intent of the North Dakota legislature was to use
the word "of". Therefore, this clause should not affect all
"rights" but "rights of indemnity."
B. Pro Rata Shares
North Dakota does not have a comparative negligence statute, therefore the provision regarding relative degrees of
fault 63 will not cause any problems.
Under section 32-39-02(2) a group of tortfeasors can constitute a single pro rata share if equity so requires. An example of such is found in Wold v. Grozalsky.6 4 P was injured by
the collapse of a wall between two buildings. A owned one of
the buildings, B and C owned the other. It was held that as
between A, B and C, the share of B and C would constitute
one half of the total liability.
The act also provides that rules of equity applicable to contribution shall apply. 65 The basic problem here is the effect of
contribution among tortfeasors when one of the tortfeasors
is insolvent or outside the jurisdiction of the court. In their
comment to this provision, the Commissioners state that
courts in contract cases have dealt satisfactorily with this
60.
61.
62.
Joint
63.
64.
65.
66.

HANDBOOK (1955), supra note 2, at 220(e).
1939 Act, 9 U.L.A. 246 § 6.
Spencer A. Gard, Chairman of Special Comm. on Rev. of Uniform
Tortfeasors Act in a letter written to this writer, October 9, 1962.
N.D. Cent. Code § 32-38-02 (1961).
277 N.Y. 364, 14 N.E.2d 437 (1938).
N.D. Cent. Code § 32-38-02(3) (1961).
HANDBOOK (1955), supra note 2, at 221.
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situation.66 In Manning v. Campbells, the court said equitable contribution is made on the basis of the solvent parties
subject to the jurisdiction of the court. The application of this
case to contribution would no doubt be within the intention of
the Commissioners in determining pro rata shares.
It should also be pointed out that determination of the pro
rata shares does not in any way affect the plaintiff's recovery.
The plaintiff is entitled to full recovery from any one of the
tortfeasors. 8
C. Enforcement
Under section 32-38-03 (5) rendition of a judgment against
the individual tortfeasor does not release the other tortfeasors
from liability until such judgment is satisfied. Section 32-3801(2) requires the tortfeasor to pay more than the pro rata
share of the common liability before an action for contribution
will lie. It follows that an adjudged tortfeasor cannot seek
69
contribution until he has satisfied the judgment against him.
Section 32-38-03(3) also provides that the adjudged tortfeasor has one year, after the judgment against him has
become final, in which to bring his action for contribution.
As pointed out above, the judgment must be paid before an
action will lie. Therefore, the adjudged tortfeasor must pay
the judgment against him and bring his action for contribu70
tion all in one year.
When a tortfeasor has by payment discharged the common
liability, without rendition of judgment, section 32-38-03(4)
allows an action for contribution to be brought. However, the
settlement must be made within the statute of limitations
period applicable to the claimant's right of action against the
settling tortfeasor. Herein lies a basic problem to this act.
Assume that A, a municipality, and B injured P. Since the
injury to P is alleged to have been caused by defective streets,
P's action against A must be preceded by a claim filed within
ninety days of the occurrence of the alleged tortious act.7 P
does not file such a claim but brings an action against B six
67. 204 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Tucker v. Nicholson, 12 Cal. 2d
427, 84 P.2d 1045 (1938).
68. Brown v. Murdy, 78 S.D. 367, 102 N.W.2d 664 (1960).
69. Associated Transp. Inc. v. Bronoume, 191 Md. 442, 62 A.2d 281 (1948).
70. Compare N.D. Cent. Code § 32-38-01(2) (1961), with N.D. Cent. Code §
32-38-03(3) (1961).
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months after the tortious act. A, by reason of statute, 72 is no
longer liable to P. P obtains a judgment against B, and B pays
the judgment immediately. B now seeks to claim contribution
from A. The facts in this hypothetical case show that the liability of A to P was extinguished by operation of law, and not
by B's payment.
Before this case can be decided several things must first
be resolved. (1)When does the right to contribution arise? It
has been held that the right to contribution arises immediately
upon the occurrence of the tortious act.7 3 Thus, in the hypothetical problem, when A and B injured P, the right to contribution immediately arose. But it has been held that there
is a distinction between the right of contribution and the accrual of the right to sue for contribution. 74 On this basis it
can be argued that the right of contribution was brought into
existence at the time of the tortious act because at that time,
there was a common liability of the tortfeasors to the injured
party. However, the accrual of a right to sue for contribution
did not arise until one of the tortfeasors extinguished what
had been the common liability at the time of the tortious act.
In other words, the words common liability as used in the statute are construed to mean the liability existing at the time of
the tortious act. Under such a construction of the statute, B's
right of contribution would ripen into a cause of action at the
time he satisfied the common liability of the parties as it
existed at the time of P's injury.
If in this case it were held that B cannot bring an action
against A, the effect would be to give P the power to determine if the right of contribution could be exercised. In Goldsberry v. Clendanie17 the court said, "It is inconceivable to me
that the Legislature should purport to grant the valuable right
of contribution among joint tortfeasors but for all practical
purposes place it within the power of the original plaintiff to
decide whether or not it could be exercised." It is submitted
that the above construction of the statute is the one most in
71.

N.D. Cent. Code § 40-42-01 (1961).

72.

Ibid.

73. Distefano v. Lamborn, 46 Del. 195, 81 A.2d 675 (1951).
74. Distefano v. Lamborn, supra note 73; cf. Panichella v. Pennsylvania
R.R. Co., 167 F. Supp. 345, rev'd on other grounds, 268 F.2d 72, cert. denied,
361 U.S. 932.
75. 49 Del. 69, 109 A.2d 407 (1954).
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line with the purposes of the act.7 6 Since contribution is held
to be an equitable duty existing between tortfeasors, 77 it does
not appear that equity would be reached by allowing P to
determine if the duty could be enforced. Further, the purpose
of the 1955 Act was to provide for a uniform law of contribution. If P is allowed to determine if the right to contribution
can be exercised, the act will fail in its purpose of uniformity.
The above problem dealt with a situation where the liability
of A was extinguished before that of B. However, a similar
problem arises where the liability of A and B expires at the
same time.
A, a resident of State X, and B, a North Dakota resident,
libel P. The statute of limitations on this type of injury is
two years.78 Just prior to the running of the statute, P files
suit against B. B cannot implead A under Rule 14 of the North
Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure because A resides in another
state. P obtains a judgment for his full damage against B.
B satisfies the judgment. A, after the running of the statute,
comes into the state and is served a summons for an action of
contribution instituted by B.
The act79 gives B the right to begin an action for contribution within a year after he has satisfied the common liability.
In this situation, B, by satisfaction of the judgment rendered
against him, removed any liability that A may have been
under. However, A has also been removed from liability to
P by the statute of limitations. A contends that if he is liable
to B for contribution, the statute of limitations for the tort
is in effect nullified.
The Commissioners state that unless the act is to be limited
to joint judgments, there is no way in which the extension of
the liability of the second tortfeasor can be avoided.8 0 This
problem stems from the requirement that the cause of action
for contribution does not arise until one of the tortfeasors
has paid more than his pro rata share. Since the latter requirement cannot be dropped without endangering the plaintiff's
right, the Commissioners thought this extention of liability
was the best solution.
76.

HANDBOOK (1955),

supra note 2, at 216.

77. Goldsberry v. Clendaniel, 49 Del. 69, 109 A.2d 407 (1954); Swartz v.
Sunderland, 403 Pa. 222, 169 A.2d 289 (1961).
78. N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01-18 (1961).
79. N.D. Cent. Code § 32-38-03(3) (1961).

596
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It is submitted that if the cause of action for contribution is
accepted as being distinct from that of the right of contribution, the intent of the statute of limitations for various actions
will not be violated; the tortfeasor from whom contribution
is sought will be liable only to the other tortfeasor and for a
different cause of action. Further, under such a theory, the
courts would follow the rule of giving full effect and meaning
to conflicting statutes."'
D. Release
Section 32-38-04 provides that a release given in good faith
to one of the tortfeasors does not release the other tortfeasors
unless its terms so provide. The question of whether the terms
given in a release discharge the other tortfeasors has been in
82
the courts often. In Raughley v. Delaware Coach Co. the
plaintiff gave one of the tortfeasors a release which stated
that it would reduce to the extent of the released tortfeasor's
pro rata share any damages recovered against the other tortfeasor. The release also stated that it was given in full settlement of any and all claims arising from the plaintiff's injuries. The court held that this latter statement did not operate
as a release of all the tortfeasors, and hence the plaintiff
could sue the other tortfeasor for the remainder of his damages. It appears that the intent of the parties will govern the
question of whether or not all the tortfeasors were released.s"
Provisions which tend to show that the named tortfeasor was
the only one intended to be released will not be construed so
84
However, if the
that all of the tortfeasors are released.
release merely states that all claims are surrendered, and no
mention is made of the possible damages recoverable against
the other tortfeasors, the release is construed as releasing all
the tortfeasors8 5
Under the 1939 Act, the release of one tortfeasor did not
6
prevent the others from seeking contributions from him. As
this tended to discourage settlements, the 1955 Act provided
80.
81.
(N.D.
82.
83.
erally
84.
85.
86.

HANDBOOK (1955), supra note 2, at 22 (e).
Workmen's Compensation Fund v. E. W. Wylie Co., 5.8 N.W.2d 76
1953).
47 Del. 343, 91 A.2d 245 (1952).
Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 64 N.W.2d 159 (1954); see gen1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 10.1 (1956).
Raughley v. Delaware Coach Co., 47 Del. 343, 91 A.2d 245 (1952).
Hodges v. United States Fid. Guar. Co., 91 A.2d 473 (D.C. 1952).
Hasselrode V. Gnagey, 404 Pa. 549, 172 A.2d 764 (1961).

1962]

NOTES

that a released tortfeasor was not liable for contribution, but
that the amount paid for the release or the amount stated in
it, whichever was the greater, would reduce the claims against
the remaining tortfeasors 7 This provision appears to be a
compromise between the act's purposes of effecting settlements of claims between litigants and preventing collusion
between a tortfeasor and an injured party.
One common problem that has arisen under this section is
the effect of the amount given for the release on the judgment
against the non-settling tortfeasor. In Price v. Wabash Railroad Co.88 the plaintiff settled with one of the tortfeasors
for $900. The jury was not informed of the settlement and
found that the plaintiff's total damages amounted to $500. It
was held that the defendant could credit the $900 that the
plaintiff received from the settling tortfeasor against the
judgment. It is submitted that the result would be the same
under the North Dakota Act. Problems also arise where the
amount paid for a release of one tortfeasor is less than the
judgment against the other. Assume that P brings an action
against A and B. Prior to the presentation of the case to the
jury, P gives A a release for $15,000. The jury is not told of
the settlement and at the conclusion of the trial bring in a
verdict of $30,000 in damages. The question is whether the
$15,000 that P received from A should be credited against the
judgment.
Such a situation appeared in State Farm Mutual Auto
Insurance Co. v. Bourne. 9 It was held that the amount paid
in settlement was to be deducted from the verdict of the jury.
It would seem that under section 32-38-04 the same result
should obtain in North Dakota.
III. Conclusion
In the construction of the North Dakota Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, the interpretations and suggestions presented will no doubt meet with some disapproval.
Such is their fate. However, it is hoped that the disapproval
will be based on an interpretation of the act and not the old
87.
88.
89.

N.D. Cent. Code § 32-38-04 (1961).
30 Ill. App. 2d 115, 174 N.E.2d 5 (1961).
220 F.2d 921 (5th Cir. 1955).
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common law rules of contribution. The act is a definite reversal of those rules, and under section 1-02-01 of the North
Dakota Century Code,90 it appears that the construction given
to the act must be a liberal one.
R. LEE HAMILTON

90. N.D. Cent. Code § 1-02-01 (1961) "The rule of the common law that
statutes in derogation thereof are to be construed strictly has no application to this code. The code establishes the law of this state respecting the
subjects to which it relates, and its provisions and all proceedings under
it are to be construed liberally with a view t6 effecting its objects and to
promoting justice."

